The Residual World::Tag = 'Risk'
Entries that have been tagged with 'Risk'.-
by Nic Plum on Thursday 07 January, 2016 - 19:37 GMT
Changes have been made to TRAK to support the description of risk and event sequences in the guise of the SVp-11 Solution Event Causes and SVp-13 Solution Risk Viewpoints. This has been a piece of work underway for at least 3 years but it seemed necessary to publish it so that the viewpoints and tuples can be exposed to wider testing i.e. used in anger.
As with most of this sort of work there is a limit to the amount of theorising that is possible and it’s necessary to test the pragmatism and utility. It’s likely therefore to undergo some tweaking. If any relationship or metamodel entity is not needed then it should be removed since the overall aim is to work with the minimum metamodel needed to just be adequate. A larger metamodel is not only harder to maintain and keep consistent but because it is only there to support the concerns in the set of TRAK viewpoints (specifications for views cf ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010:2011) it follows that a larger metamodel makes definition of a consistent set of viewpoints harder. With more entities and relationships it is also likely that an architecture description can become more complex and require more effort to present it clearly to get the meaning across (at least to a Mk 1 Human Being since being based on triples a TRAK architecture description is machine-readable and analysable). Every tuple in the TRAK metamodel has therefore to earn its keep / justify not being removed.
In a previous posting I identified why we think, in TRAK at least, that a risk is a type of event and why many of the current definitions of risk do not actually define what a risk is (only how you might calculate a number or metric i.e. probability of occurrence x impact severity).
We’ve tied risk to the solution because we think that this is where it most often manifests itself in terms of design features or changes to the design of the system of interest to mitigate it. In engineering terms it is really the cumulative risk exposure to people that drives design change hence it makes sense to be able to relate risk, vulnerability, threats and mitigation to a solution design whether the causing agent or the impacted one.
TRAK therefore supports the following triples / tuples for describing risk:-
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- Resource (System, Software, Physical, Role, Job or Organisation) has Vulnerability
- Function has Vulnerability - what the Resource does
- Resource Interaction has Vulnerability - the exchange between Resources
- Interaction Element has Vulnerability - what is exchanged between Resources
- Resource poses Threat (synonym Hazard)
- Threat exploits Vulnerability
- Threat to Resource
- Threat to Function
- Threat to Resource Interaction
- Threat to Interaction Element
- Threat poses Risk
- Resource exposed to Risk
- Risk is managed by Mitigation
- Mitigation uses Function
- Mitigation uses Resource
By way of a small example using a small subset of the above we have a nuclear reactor.
It is possible to identify an external actor as the origin of the threat (hazard) - ‘Resource 1 poses Threat to Resource 2’. Similarly mitigation might be a result of a part of the same resource or it might require a different one (‘Resource 1 is exposed to Risk is managed by Mitigation uses Resource 2’).
In all of this the description of Risk, Vulnerability, Threat (Hazard) and Mitigation can be linked to the description of the solution or part of the solution. This therefore enables the solution design to be modified in response or the mitigation to be altered in response to a design change so the cause and effect is always visible in the architecture description.
So far all of this is pretty straightforwards. The “toughie” is:-
- Risk is a Event
This is tricky not because there is any doubt that a Risk is a type of Event. A risk typically is associated with a probability of occurrence and an impact severity. If we are thinking about an event in the way it would be used in, say, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) then it also has a probability of occurrence. It too can have an impact severity. So are there differentiating attributes of a risk (event)? We couldn’t think of any - suggestions welcome. The rationale for having a separate Risk metamodel element was simply that people might expect to see elements labelled as ‘Risk’ because they might not equate ‘Event’ with the description of a risk (affordance and visibility).
Note. Although there isn’t a difference in the attributes there is a distinction in the possible values A Risk and an Event can take. A Risk, by definition is always uncertain but possible therefore 0 < probability of occurrenceRisk < 100% whereas a ‘straight‘ Event may be impossible or certain and therefore 0 ≤ probability of occurrenceEvent ≤ 100%. Risk therefore seems to occupy a subset of the range of values for Event.Is this worth having 2 distinct elements, particularly since the inheritance (‘is a’) means that we also have:-
- Risk caused by Risk
- Risk impacts on Resource
- Risk caused by Resource
- Risk AND / OR / etc. Risk
and this is less clear when Risk and Event are separate entities on the metamodel diagram.
If there was the one element, Event, then it would still allow risks (Events) to be clustered or grouped which would allow the SVp-11 to be used to describe and identify common causal risk (events) and therefore suggest ways in which risks might be managed. The only penalty seems therefore to be 1) visibility - can risks be identified as such when typed as Event? 2) affordance - is it obvious that an Event element can be used to describe a risk?
Can anyone justify why Risk and Event should be distinct or why they should be subsumed into Event? Clearly from a TRAK-management point of view it would be better to apply the Highlander Principle (“there shall only be one”) but this might overridden by the UI / HCI aspects.
- Risk and Threats - The Common Ground Between Security and Safety? (70% )
- Definitions - What Exactly is a Risk Part 2? (60% )
- Definitions - What Exactly is a Risk? (30% )
- What Would a TRAK View Look Like in a Graph Database? Part 1 (20% )
- Just When You Thought It Was Safe - EntiTy Returns (10% )
- TRAK00001. TRAK. Enterprise Architecture Framework. Viewpoints. 1st January 2016
- TRAK00002. TRAK. Enterprise Architecture Framework. Metamodel. 1st January 2016
- TRAK Metamodel fragment - Safety & Security 1st January 2016 - Wikimedia Commons - https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ATRAK_metamodel_part_2_safety_security.jpg
by Nic Plum on Monday 05 August, 2013 - 21:46 GMT
In part 1 we established that a lot of the current definitions of risk don’t actually define what a risk is - they simply define a formula for calculating it or prioritising it which doesn’t help us get at what a risk is and therefore whether it is a distinct entity.
The OED has a definition:
(Exposure to) the possibility of loss, injury, or other adverse or unwelcome circumstance; a chance or situation involving such a possibility
Dissecting this with the old semantic scalpel we have parts:
- possibility or chance
- adverse circumstance
- a situation
Possibility or Chance
A risk always has a probability of occurring. This therefore means that the metamodel entity has ‘probability of occurrence’ as an attribute. It also means that there are qualifying values in order for it to be a risk - the probability of occurrence cannot be zero since there is then no possibility and it cannot be 100% either because it is then a certainty not a risk.
A risk is associated with a harmful outcome (the positive flip side is an opportunity). We can represent this using a relationship between risk (if the vehicle for risk is an event) and hazard (threat).
This starts to sound like an event through which the unlucky recipient is exposed to the risk. Is this a risk or is it really a description of a risky-event?
Much the same thing happens to hazard where at least one definitions defines a hazardous event not a hazard. In IEC 61508:2010 part 4 Hazard is defined as:
potential source of harm [Guide 51 ISO/IEC:1990]
but then add
NOTE – The term includes danger to persons arising within a short time scale (for example, fire and explosion) and also those that have a long-term effect on a person’s health (for example, release of a toxic substance).
which isn’t correct because the release of a toxic substance is not a hazard but a hazardous event. The toxic substance represents the hazard. This is important because we’d represent hazard and hazardous event differently with a relationship between a Hazard and Event and the combination becomes the ‘hazardous event’.
Is something similar happening with risk in common parlance or definitions?
If a Risk is a distinct entity we have:
- Hazard (syn. Threat) poses Risk
- Risk is a Event (where 100 > probability of occurrence > 0)
and we can have
- Hazard (syn. Threat) to Resource (i.e System, Physical, Software, Organisation, Job or Role)
to introduce the required ‘harm’ or ‘adverse circumstance’.
The limits on probability of occurrence have to be applied because if it is 100% it isn’t a possibility it’s a certainty and therefore no longer a risk. Similarly it cannot be zero because it can never happen and is therefore not a risk.
We could of course just represent a Risk using Event where the value of an attribute ‘probability of occurrence’ takes a value between these limits when representing a risk and is otherwise null or 100% if representing a ‘straight’ Event.
Of course even if it is a type of event there are advantages in making it a distinct entity since as an element in a tool it makes it easy to find, to navigate to or from and to distinguish it from a straight event. This utility might justify it being distinct.
So, is a risk a type of event?
- Solution Risk, Vulnerability, Threat and Mitigation - Does Risk Need to be Separate from Event? (100% )
- Risk and Threats - The Common Ground Between Security and Safety? (67% )
- Definitions - What Exactly is a Risk? (33% )
- What Would a TRAK View Look Like in a Graph Database? Part 1 (17% )
- ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010:2011, Systems and software engineering—Architecture Description Released (17% )
by Nic Plum on Tuesday 10 April, 2012 - 21:25 GMT
This is something that has been bumbling around for some considerable time - safety and security. By that I whether there is something useful that an enterprise architecture view can be used for in the system safety and security disciplines.
On the face of it there is quite a bit of overlap. Both are ultimately concerned with risk inherent in a solution design which arises from threats (security) or hazards (safety). Both involve management with the aim to reduce the risk, threat or accident (safety) to an acceptable or tolerable target. I suspect also that security management also uses categories to classify acceptable severity or probability in much the same way that the various system safety management standards in defence do (MIL STD 882D, DEF STAN 00-56). Both also involve mitigation of risk by design - through structure, behaviour, or adherence to a normative process of some sort.
There are bound to be some differences, not the least of which is terminology. In the security area we seem to have constructs like:
- Threat poses Risk
- Threat exploits Vulnerability
- design aka TRAK:Resource (System, Software, Organisation, Job or Role) exposed to Risk (and subsequently that Risk is mitigated by the (improved) Resource or Function (of that Resource)
In the safety area we seem to have constructs like:
- Failure may present Hazard
- Hazard can cause Accident
- Accident poses Risk
- Resource exhibits Failure
and attributes such as probability, impact, severity.
Anyway it seems sensible to open up the debate so I’ve posted some thoughts in the forums within the TRAK Viewpoints project site on Sourceforge. Something is definitely needed and my hunch is that there is so much overlap that it would be possible to create a Viewpoint that addresses the risk within a solution design. This may of course end up being two viewpoints depending on the concerns and therefore concepts (metamodel stereotypes) and relationships involved. What is needed is more debate and input from those involved with system safety and system security - hence the post. As ever with TRAK the objective is economy so that we have something that is just or barely adequate to describe the concerns and concepts involved and no more.
- Solution Risk, Vulnerability, Threat and Mitigation - Does Risk Need to be Separate from Event? (41% )
- Definitions - What Exactly is a Risk? (29% )
- Just When You Thought It Was Safe - EntiTy Returns (24% )
- Definitions - What Exactly is a Risk Part 2? (24% )
- What Would a TRAK View Look Like in a Graph Database? Part 1 (18% )
- DEF STAN 00-56/4 Part 1 / Part 2 Safety Management Requirements For Defence Systems. [registration needed to access]
- MIL STD 882D. Department Of Defense Standard Practice For System Safety. February 2000
- Cabinet Office. Security Policy Framework. V7 October 2011.
- Security Ontology. Stefan Fenz.
- Secure Business Austria. Security Ontology.
- HIPAA Security Series. 6 Basics of Risk Analysis and Risk Management.
- Safety & Functional Safety. ABB Brochure 1SFC001008B0201.